The Chinese are known for their mastery of deception and denial, a mindset that aligns trust with the art of evasion. In 2016, to counter India’s stance on Masood Azhar, Beijing invoked obscure rules under the 1267 regime, demanding “solid evidence” of Azhar’s direct ties with al-Qaeda. Even though the burden of proof didn’t rest on India, Beijing sought to pressure India by emphasizing “consensus,” despite the overwhelming global opinion favoring action against Azhar.
Supporting India over Pakistan made little strategic sense for China, especially when curbing Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) activities could spark resistance to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects. Instead, India’s insistence allowed Beijing to quietly exert influence on Islamabad to protect its investments.
A similar tactic was used to block India’s Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) bid. China framed it as a “multilateral issue,” claiming it wasn’t solely responsible for the blockade, while skillfully diverting the debate. This move signaled Beijing’s belief that Washington no longer monopolizes global agenda-setting. China’s subtle retort to Washington’s “outlier” remark was telling: “NSG membership isn’t a gift nations can bestow upon each other.” Beijing expected New Delhi to engage it directly, rather than seeking last-minute discussions, implying that a deal could be struck if India’s policy wasn’t entirely aligned with the U.S.
China’s rigid stance on arms control, shaped by U.S. policies, reflects its non-proliferation experts’ refusal to make exceptions for India. India’s rise has always been unsettling for China. While China acknowledges India’s economic growth as an opportunity to expand its business presence, it also seeks to curtail India’s global influence, sowing seeds of doubt in Indian policymakers.
China finds India’s inconsistent messaging, particularly through the media, perplexing. Any deviation from agreed mechanisms erodes trust. For instance, when former Chief of Defence Staff Bipin Rawat called China India’s “biggest security threat,” Beijing viewed this as a breach of the strategic guidance agreed upon by both nations’ leaders, labeling it an attempt to provoke geopolitical confrontation—“irresponsible and dangerous.”
Mutual knowledge gaps and a lack of nuanced understanding lead to misinterpretations. As a result, signals sent by one side often fail to resonate with the other. For example, if India makes empty threats or bluffs without credible actions, China will ignore them. Even genuine threats hold no weight without tangible follow-through, and India must be willing to bear the political cost of retreating if necessary. India’s use of the ‘Tibet Card’ is seen as a provocation, backed by U.S. support.
Despite these tensions, India and China have made attempts to improve relations. The Wuhan Summit in 2018 was a significant effort. High-level meetings between India’s National Security Advisor Rajinder Khanna and President Xi Jinping, as well as Chinese Public Security Minister Zhao Kezhi’s talks with Prime Minister Modi, led to a substantial agreement on security cooperation, hailed as a turning point by Chinese media.
China’s refusal to bail out Pakistan in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and India’s subsequent support for China’s bid for the FATF Vice Presidency indicated a shift. India also curtailed the Dalai Lama’s activities in return. Additionally, India’s proposal for a UN Convention on International Terrorism gained momentum when the 2018 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Qingdao called for a comprehensive UN treaty on international terrorism. India expects China to support its counterterrorism efforts, especially given the validity of Xinjiang’s terrorism issue, as long as Pakistan isn’t involved. Notably, India had denied a visa to Uyghur leader Dolkun Isa in 2016, showing sensitivity to Chinese concerns.
China’s approach in Xinjiang combines ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ policies, including social reforms that, if implemented in India, would violate fundamental rights and provoke Western criticism over human rights. China views Xinjiang as an ancient Saka (Scythian) land with Buddhist roots tied to Kashmir and dismisses Islam’s later influence as a legitimate basis for Uyghur secession.
The core of the India-China conflict lies in strategic intent, not just the border issue, though the border could spark more flashpoints. Border tensions seem to be part of a broader strategy. As L. Natarajan noted, “The American shadow over the Himalayas” began looming even weeks before Partition in 1947. The border dispute is a symptom, not the cause, of mistrust, which has devolved into a vicious cycle of hostility.
Currently, diplomacy requires a shift. Sending mixed signals and relying on Cold War-era tactics no longer align with China’s capacity to destabilize India through more sophisticated means. India should avoid falling into the trap of provocation, as national hysteria could be exploited to derail its economic rise. Prime Minister Modi seems keen to avoid repeating Nehru’s mistakes.
Reconciliation is essential, but not at the expense of India’s core interests. A strategic dialogue is necessary not only to normalize relations but also to craft a clever approach to accessing Chinese markets and connecting with 800 million Chinese Dharma followers. China, for its part, must also rethink its stance on India’s rise.
A genuine transformation in the relationship can occur through culturally nuanced, top-down approaches, such as the Wuhan process. Only such measures can ease the current tensions and restore balance.
Jay Hind
-----Mrunmay Manoj Pote.
nice article
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