SIACHEN 1987.

 

Siachen is a battlefield where information rarely trickles down to the outside world. Remarkable acts of bravery often remain buried in the snow, forgotten without a trace. While a ceasefire is in place today, and the primary threats are now posed by the harsh weather and treacherous terrain, it wasn’t always this way. From April 13, 1984, to November 26, 2003, Siachen was a highly contested zone, where victory or defeat hung by a slender thread. The fog of war was thick, and logistical challenges were immense. Casualty evacuation was a significant concern, with fallen soldiers being heartbreakingly categorized as P4 (Priority 4), the lowest priority for retrieval from the snowy heights.

Numerous books have been written on this unique conflict, but most are by those who have never served there or felt the weight of decision-making in such extreme conditions. Battles were fought at 20,000 feet, in temperatures plummeting to -60°C, a challenge difficult to fathom. However, Lt Gen Ramesh Kulkarni, a former GOC of the 28 Infantry Division, who commanded this division during one of its most crucial periods, from 1987 to 1988, has provided an invaluable service to the strategic community and the armed forces by penning this memoir.

The book covers the crucial years of 1987-89, a period marked by the establishment of Bana Post—a story known mainly to the soldiers who served on the glacier. Unfortunately, this critical period in military history has been insufficiently recorded. General Kulkarni and his daughter Anjali have penned the memoir from memory, with his son Abhijit adding interpretations from his notes. The General took no notes during his service, nor did he save any documents for personal records. This shows that he had no intention of recounting these experiences, which are almost 36 years old, until a conclave of General Officers who commanded the 28 Infantry Division urged him to write about the division's Siachen sojourn. The division, currently one of the premier formations in the Kashmir Valley, was unaware of its own history.

In General Kulkarni’s words, “there is no authentic record of the tenacity and grit that our troops displayed under extreme conditions and with the limited resources available to them during this stretch of time.” By the time he assumed command at Nimu, Operation Meghdoot was already three years old. Interestingly, in July 1987, as he took over, another operation, Operation Pawan in Sri Lanka, was being launched. This peacekeeping mission quickly escalated into an out-of-area counterinsurgency campaign. Pakistan saw this as a moment of opportunity to launch operations against the Saltoro Range in an attempt to evict the Indian Army and push it back to lower ground on the Siachen glacier.

General Kulkarni’s book recounts the Pakistani Army's attempts to dislodge the Indian Army and the heroic resistance of Indian troops under his command. The narrative is made even more compelling by the fact that these efforts were led by none other than Brigadier (later General) Parvez Musharraf, commander of the Pakistani SSG Brigade. It is not unreasonable to believe that Musharraf’s failure here inspired his later move to occupy the Kargil Heights in 1999, assuming that the Pakistani forces would be able to hold their ground just as the 28 Infantry Division had done in Siachen.

A well-crafted foreword sets the stage for the book, while a "Note on the Glacier" by renowned mountaineer Harish Kapadia provides essential context for those unfamiliar with the terrain and challenges. The narrative that follows is filled with vivid descriptions of the terrain, enemy maneuvers, and logistical nightmares that made this a battle like no other. The build-up to General Kulkarni's command of the 28 Infantry Division is particularly captivating, showcasing the experience and trust he garnered over crucial years, especially as Maj Gen General Staff (MGGS) at HQ Northern Command under Lt Gen Ashok Handoo.

The book’s accounts of the battles for the heights are outstanding, worthy of being studied and perhaps taught at military and civilian institutions alike. The capture of Qaid Post during Op Rajiv and the defense of the Bila Fondla Pass make for enthralling reading. Rarely have I encountered a memoir where the author so generously acknowledges the contributions of his subordinates and family while candidly admitting to his own human frailties.

This is not just a book for the armed forces; it has valuable lessons for the corporate world as well. The simplicity and human aspects of leadership under extreme conditions are what stand out the most. Personally, having known the author and his family for over 53 years, the book was a delight to read. The pleasure was doubled, as I am familiar with the ground, having commanded in the Northern Glacier myself in 1995.

This memoir is not just an account of a military career; it is a testament to the indomitable spirit and resilience of those who serve under the harshest conditions. It’s a must-read for anyone looking to understand what true grit and leadership under fire mean.

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-- Mrunmay Manoj Pote

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Strategic Deception and Diplomacy: Navigating the Complex India-China Relationship

The Chinese are known for their mastery of deception and denial, a mindset that aligns trust with the art of evasion. In 2016, to counter India’s stance on Masood Azhar, Beijing invoked obscure rules under the 1267 regime, demanding “solid evidence” of Azhar’s direct ties with al-Qaeda. Even though the burden of proof didn’t rest on India, Beijing sought to pressure India by emphasizing “consensus,” despite the overwhelming global opinion favoring action against Azhar.

Supporting India over Pakistan made little strategic sense for China, especially when curbing Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) activities could spark resistance to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects. Instead, India’s insistence allowed Beijing to quietly exert influence on Islamabad to protect its investments.

A similar tactic was used to block India’s Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) bid. China framed it as a “multilateral issue,” claiming it wasn’t solely responsible for the blockade, while skillfully diverting the debate. This move signaled Beijing’s belief that Washington no longer monopolizes global agenda-setting. China’s subtle retort to Washington’s “outlier” remark was telling: “NSG membership isn’t a gift nations can bestow upon each other.” Beijing expected New Delhi to engage it directly, rather than seeking last-minute discussions, implying that a deal could be struck if India’s policy wasn’t entirely aligned with the U.S.

China’s rigid stance on arms control, shaped by U.S. policies, reflects its non-proliferation experts’ refusal to make exceptions for India. India’s rise has always been unsettling for China. While China acknowledges India’s economic growth as an opportunity to expand its business presence, it also seeks to curtail India’s global influence, sowing seeds of doubt in Indian policymakers.

China finds India’s inconsistent messaging, particularly through the media, perplexing. Any deviation from agreed mechanisms erodes trust. For instance, when former Chief of Defence Staff Bipin Rawat called China India’s “biggest security threat,” Beijing viewed this as a breach of the strategic guidance agreed upon by both nations’ leaders, labeling it an attempt to provoke geopolitical confrontation—“irresponsible and dangerous.”

Mutual knowledge gaps and a lack of nuanced understanding lead to misinterpretations. As a result, signals sent by one side often fail to resonate with the other. For example, if India makes empty threats or bluffs without credible actions, China will ignore them. Even genuine threats hold no weight without tangible follow-through, and India must be willing to bear the political cost of retreating if necessary. India’s use of the ‘Tibet Card’ is seen as a provocation, backed by U.S. support.

Despite these tensions, India and China have made attempts to improve relations. The Wuhan Summit in 2018 was a significant effort. High-level meetings between India’s National Security Advisor Rajinder Khanna and President Xi Jinping, as well as Chinese Public Security Minister Zhao Kezhi’s talks with Prime Minister Modi, led to a substantial agreement on security cooperation, hailed as a turning point by Chinese media.

China’s refusal to bail out Pakistan in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and India’s subsequent support for China’s bid for the FATF Vice Presidency indicated a shift. India also curtailed the Dalai Lama’s activities in return. Additionally, India’s proposal for a UN Convention on International Terrorism gained momentum when the 2018 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Qingdao called for a comprehensive UN treaty on international terrorism. India expects China to support its counterterrorism efforts, especially given the validity of Xinjiang’s terrorism issue, as long as Pakistan isn’t involved. Notably, India had denied a visa to Uyghur leader Dolkun Isa in 2016, showing sensitivity to Chinese concerns.

China’s approach in Xinjiang combines ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ policies, including social reforms that, if implemented in India, would violate fundamental rights and provoke Western criticism over human rights. China views Xinjiang as an ancient Saka (Scythian) land with Buddhist roots tied to Kashmir and dismisses Islam’s later influence as a legitimate basis for Uyghur secession.

The core of the India-China conflict lies in strategic intent, not just the border issue, though the border could spark more flashpoints. Border tensions seem to be part of a broader strategy. As L. Natarajan noted, “The American shadow over the Himalayas” began looming even weeks before Partition in 1947. The border dispute is a symptom, not the cause, of mistrust, which has devolved into a vicious cycle of hostility.

Currently, diplomacy requires a shift. Sending mixed signals and relying on Cold War-era tactics no longer align with China’s capacity to destabilize India through more sophisticated means. India should avoid falling into the trap of provocation, as national hysteria could be exploited to derail its economic rise. Prime Minister Modi seems keen to avoid repeating Nehru’s mistakes.

Reconciliation is essential, but not at the expense of India’s core interests. A strategic dialogue is necessary not only to normalize relations but also to craft a clever approach to accessing Chinese markets and connecting with 800 million Chinese Dharma followers. China, for its part, must also rethink its stance on India’s rise.

A genuine transformation in the relationship can occur through culturally nuanced, top-down approaches, such as the Wuhan process. Only such measures can ease the current tensions and restore balance.

Jay Hind

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-----Mrunmay Manoj Pote.

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